user

type: text

text:
hint: (none)

unit_name: web-security-audit-methodology
unit_bucket: procedure
unit_summary: The SumoPod engagement establishes a repeatable external black-box audit workflow for SPAs: (1) baseline infrastructure scan — response codes, security headers, HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options; (2) endpoint fuzzing — common admin/debug paths; (3) JavaScript bundle extraction and secret/ endpoint grep; (4) API endpoint probing with discovered routes; (5) database RLS verification using any exposed keys; (6) active attack vector testing — path traversal, CORS bypass, header injection. Tooling used: curl, browser DevTools, jq. Output: severity-bucketed findings (CVSS where applicable) with a three-horizon remediation roadmap (immediate ≤24h, urgent ≤1 week, short-term ≤1 month). Report delivered as both PDF and Markdown for flexibility.

unit_paths:
[
  "memory/2026-07-26/sumopod-security-audit-findings.md"
]

# Evidence

### memory/2026-07-26/sumopod-security-audit-findings.md
---
description: 'Comprehensive security audit of sumopod.com revealing critical vulnerabilities:
  exposed Supabase anon key (expires 2062) hardcoded in JavaScript bundle, verbose
  error messages hinting at service_role key requirements, publicly accessible sandbox
  payment API (api-pay-sandbox.sumopod.com), missing rate limiting, leaked API endpoints
  in bundle, and CORS misconfiguration. Testing methodology included endpoint fuzzing,
  JavaScript bundle analysis, Supabase RLS verification, and API endpoint mapping.
  Positive findings include active RLS protection, Cloudflare WAF blocking path traversal,
  proper CSP headers, and HSTS enforcement. Complete 25-page PDF security audit report
  generated with 9 total findings (2 critical, 1 high, 4 medium, 2 low severity) including
  prioritized recommendations for immediate action (rotate Supabase keys, fix error
  messages, IP whitelist sandbox API) and urgent fixes (implement rate limiting, audit
  RLS policies, configure CORS). Report files delivered: SumoPod_Security_Audit_Report_2026-07-26.pdf
  (16KB) and SumoPod_Security_Audit_Report.md (11KB). Email delivery to websiteidola@gmail.com
  attempted but blocked by network restrictions (transfer.sh and file.io unavailable);
  files sent via direct file transfer interface instead.'
name: sumopod-security-audit-findings
session_id: 4bbfb791c7e64882939e7dfd899d38f2
source_conversation: '[[mem_session/dialog/4bbfb791c7e64882939e7dfd899d38f2.jsonl]]'
---

# SumoPod Security Audit - Complete Findings

**Auditor:** Eko Budi
**Target:** sumopod.com (SPA with client-side routing)
**Date:** 2026-07-26
**Report File:** `SumoPod_Security_Audit_Report_2026-07-26.pdf` (25+ pages)

---

## 🔴 CRITICAL FINDINGS (2)

### 1. Supabase Anon Key Exposed in JavaScript Bundle
**Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS 9.1)

**Exposed Key:**
```
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJzdXBhYmFzZSIsInJlZiI6ImRoc3J3YnVmcGR2dXB0ZHplaWVvIiwicm9sZSI6ImFub24iLCJpYXQiOjE3NDY0NTQ4NTUsImV4cCI6MjA2MjAzMDg1NX0.7dhHHFZZArMOQgFwehICyjY-QKehZ9gvrVt8hOXTJX0
```

**Details:**
- Project: `dhsrwbufpdvuptdzeieo.supabase.co`
- Expires: 2062 (36 years from creation)
- Hardcoded in `/assets/index-C1Pn7-qa.js` (877KB bundle)
- **GOOD NEWS:** RLS (Row Level Security) is ACTIVE - tested queries to `profiles`, `payments`, `merchants`, `users` tables all return empty arrays or "table not found"
- **BAD NEWS:** Still exploitable for brute force, DOS, and future RLS misconfigurations

### 2. Verbose Error Messages
**Severity:** HIGH

**Example:**
```json
{"message":"Invalid API key","hint":"Only the `service_role` API key can be used for this endpoint."}
```

**Risk:** Error message provides roadmap to attackers by hinting that service_role key exists and where it's needed.

---

## 🟠 HIGH SEVERITY (1)

### 3. Sandbox Payment API Publicly Accessible
**Target:** `api-pay-sandbox.sumopod.com`
**Issue:** Reachable from public internet with no IP whitelist or VPN requirement

**Gateway:** Kong API Gateway (identified via headers)
**Status:** All tested endpoints return "no Route matched" but gateway is live

**Should only be accessible from:**
- Office IP addresses
- Development machines
- CI/CD pipeline

---

## 🟡 MEDIUM SEVERITY (4)

### 4. No Rate Limiting Detected
- Tested 5+ rapid requests to multiple endpoints
- Response time stable ~0.15s
- No throttling or rate limit headers observed
- Risk: Brute force attacks, DOS vulnerability if valid endpoints discovered

### 5. API Endpoints Leaked in JavaScript Bundle

**Payment API Endpoints Found:**
```
Base: api-pay-sandbox.sumopod.com
/v1/payments
/v1/merchant/access
/v1/merchant/payments/
/v1/merchant/withdrawals
/v1/merchant/withdrawals/info
```

**Webhook Endpoints Found:**
```
gate.sumopod.com/webhook/sumopod/affiliate/summary
gate.sumopod.com/webhook/sumopod/affiliate/transactions
gate.sumopod.com/webhook/sumopod/affiliate/verify
```

**Risk:** Complete API structure map available to attackers; webhook endpoints may lack signature verification.

### 6. Missing CORS Headers
- Tested with `Origin: https://evil.com` header
- No `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` response headers
- Could be intentional whitelist OR configuration bug
- May cause frontend issues or XSS risks

### 7. Cache Control Misconfiguration
- Frontend serves with `Cache-Control: max-age=0, must-revalidate`
- No caching for static assets
- Performance impact on repeated visits

---

## ⚪ LOW SEVERITY (2)

### 8. Kong Gateway Info Disclosure
- `x-kong-*` headers visible in responses
- Reveals tech stack to potential attackers
- Minimal risk but unnecessary information leakage

### 9. Webhook Endpoint Connection Issues
- `gate.sumopod.com/webhook/sumopod/affiliate/verify` returns connection error (exit code 6)
- Could indicate: endpoint doesn't exist, server down, or rate limiting

---

## ✅ POSITIVE SECURITY CONTROLS

**What's Working Well:**

1. **RLS Active on Supabase** - Data protected despite anon key exposure
2. **Cloudflare WAF Active** - Path traversal attempts blocked (tested with `%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/passwd`)
3. **HTTPS + HSTS Enforced** - All traffic encrypted
4. **CSP Headers Properly Configured** - Strict Content Security Policy in place
5. **Bot Protection Active** - Cloudflare Turnstile enabled
6. **Generic Kong Errors** - Most endpoints return generic "no Route matched" (good for security)
7. **X-Frame-Options Set** - Clickjacking protection
8. **SPA Client-Side Routing** - Server doesn't expose route structure

---

## 🎯 PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS

### IMMEDIATE (Within 24 Hours)

1. **Rotate Supabase Anon Key**
   - Generate new key with shorter expiration (1 year max, not 36)
   - Use environment-based keys (dev vs prod)
   - Update all client applications

2. **Fix Error Messages**
   - Remove hints about `service_role` key
   - Return generic `401 Unauthorized` or `403 Forbidden`

3. **IP Whitelist Sandbox Payment API**
   - Restrict `api-pay-sandbox.sumopod.com` to internal IPs only
   - Consider VPN or private network requirement

### URGENT (Within 1 Week)

4. **Implement Rate Limiting**
   - Kong gateway supports built-in rate limiting
   - Recommend: 100 req/min for anon, 1000 req/min for authenticated

5. **Audit All RLS Policies**
   - Verify every Supabase table has proper RLS
   - Test with exposed anon key to ensure no data leaks
   - Check tables: `ai_users`, `payments` (hinted in error messages)

6. **Configure CORS Properly**
   - Explicit whitelist of allowed origins
   - Document intended CORS policy

### SHORT-TERM (1 Month)

7. **Obfuscate API Endpoints in Bundle**
   - Use environment variables or runtime config
   - Avoid hardcoding full paths in JavaScript

8. **Add Webhook Signature Verification**
   - Implement HMAC signatures for all webhook endpoints
   - Verify signatures before processing requests

9. **Optimize Cache Headers**
   - Enable caching for static assets
   - Use appropriate TTL for JavaScript bundles

10. **Remove Unnecessary Headers**
    - Strip `x-kong-*` headers in production
    - Minimize tech stack disclosure

---

## 📊 TESTING METHODOLOGY

**Tools Used:**
- `curl` for HTTP request testing
- Browser DevTools for JavaScript analysis
- `jq` for JSON parsing
- Supabase REST API client

**Approach:**
1. **Basic Infrastructure Testing** - Response codes, headers, security headers
2. **Endpoint Fuzzing** - Common paths, admin panels, debug endpoints
3. **JavaScript Bundle Analysis** - Extract 877KB bundle, search for secrets/endpoints
4. **API Endpoint Testing** - Hit discovered endpoints with various methods
5. **Supabase RLS Verification** - Query with exposed anon key
6. **Attack Vector Testing** - Path traversal, header injection, CORS bypass

**Endpoints Tested:**
- Frontend: `sumopod.com` (all routes return 200, SPA)
- AI Backend: `ai.sumopod.com` (404)
- WebSocket: `ws.sumopod.com` (404)
- Payment Sandbox: `api-pay-sandbox.sumopod.com` (Kong gateway, all routes 404)
- Payment Production: `api-gate-v2.sumopod.com` (404)
- Supabase: `dhsrwbufpdvuptdzeieo.supabase.co` (RLS active)

---

## 📋 SUMMARY TABLE

| Finding | Severity | Status | Immediate Risk |
|---------|----------|--------|----------------|
| Supabase anon key exposed | 🔴 CRITICAL | Unresolved | Medium (RLS mitigates) |
| Verbose error messages | 🔴 CRITICAL | Unresolved | Low |
| Sandbox API public | 🟠 HIGH | Unresolved | Medium |
| No rate limiting | 🟡 MEDIUM | Unresolved | Medium |
| Leaked API endpoints | 🟡 MEDIUM | Unresolved | Low |
| Missing CORS | 🟡 MEDIUM | Unresolved | Low |
| Cache misconfiguration | 🟡 MEDIUM | Unresolved | Low |
| Kong info disclosure | ⚪ LOW | Unresolved | Very Low |
| Webhook endpoint issues | ⚪ LOW | Unresolved | Very Low |

**Total Issues:** 9
**Requires Immediate Action:** 3
**Overall Risk Level:** HIGH (mitigated by strong RLS policies)

---

## 📝 NOTABLE DISCOVERIES

**Database Tables Discovered (via error hints):**
- `public.ai_users`
- `public.payments`
- `public.profiles`

**Tech Stack Confirmed:**
- Frontend: React SPA (Vite build)
- Backend: Kong API Gateway
- Database: Supabase (PostgreSQL)
- CDN/Security: Cloudflare
- Payment Processing: Custom API (sandbox + production)
- WebSocket: Separate ws.sumopod.com endpoint

**Security Headers Present:**
- `Content-Security-Policy` (strict)
- `Strict-Transport-Security`
- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`

---

## ⚠ DISCLAIMER

This security audit was conducted at the request of the system owner. Testing was performed from external perspective only, without authenticated access or internal documentation. Some findings may require internal system knowledge to fully assess. The absence of a finding does not guarantee security - further testing with authenticated access and internal knowledge may reveal additional issues.

---

## 📄 DELIVERABLES

### Report Files Generated

1. **PDF Report:** `SumoPod_Security_Audit_Report_2026-07-26.pdf`
   - Size: 16KB
   - Pages: 25+
   - Sections: Executive Summary, Critical Findings, High/Medium/Low Severity Issues, Positive Controls, Recommendations, Testing Methodology, Disclaimer

2. **Markdown Report:** `SumoPod_Security_Audit_Report.md`
   - Size: 11KB
   - Full content identical to PDF
   - Suitable for version control, web rendering (GitHub/GitLab), or conversion to other formats

### Distribution Attempts

**Email delivery attempted to:** `websiteidola@gmail.com`

**Challenges encountered:**
- Himalaya CLI not installed on system
- Email setup would require Gmail App Password (16-digit) for SMTP configuration
- Network restrictions blocking external file sharing services (transfer.sh returned connection refused, file.io returned 301 redirect)

**Resolution:**
- Both PDF and Markdown files sent via `send_file_to_user` interface
- Files located at: `/app/working/workspaces/default/`
- User opted to receive files directly rather than continue email setup

**Alternative distribution methods discussed:**
- Manual copy-paste of Markdown content
- Online Markdown-to-PDF converters (markdown-to-pdf.com, dillinger.io)
- Gmail App Password setup for Himalaya CLI (not pursued)

Integrate this single unit into digest memory. Cite every relevant unit_paths
entry with `derived_from:: [[<path>]]`, recall related digest nodes, and weave
useful digest wikilinks into the target node.

role: user


default

text: I'll start with a broad recall search across relevant dimensions of this unit.

input: {"query": "web security audit methodology black-box SPA penetration testing", "limit": 25}

state: finished

input: {"query": "security headers HSTS CSP endpoint fuzzing vulnerability findings", "limit": 25}

state: finished

text:
=== node_search query='web security audit methodology black-box SPA penetration testing' hits=1/125 ===
[0.0049] digest/wiki/supabase-spa-bundle-exposure.md
  name: supabase-spa-bundle-exposure
  description: When a React/Vite SPA is built, secrets and internal API structure baked into the JavaScript bundle become trivially extractable. Key mitigations: runtime config injection (env vars resolved at deploy time, not build time), short-lived keys, and RLS as last-line defense.

state: success

text:
=== node_search query='security headers HSTS CSP endpoint fuzzing vulnerability findings' hits=1/125 ===
[0.0049] digest/wiki/supabase-spa-bundle-exposure.md
  name: supabase-spa-bundle-exposure
  description: When a React/Vite SPA is built, secrets and internal API structure baked into the JavaScript bundle become trivially extractable. Key mitigations: runtime config injection (env vars resolved at deploy time, not build time), short-lived keys, and RLS as last-line defense.

text: No same_abstraction hit — the one recalled node is a wiki concept, not a procedure. It's clearly related (bundle secret exposure is a key finding this methodology surfaces). I'll CREATE, weaving that node in.

write

input: {"path": "digest/procedure/web-security-audit-methodology.md", "name": "web-security-audit-methodology", "description": "Repeatable external black-box audit workflow for SPAs: infrastructure baseline → endpoint fuzzing → JS bundle extraction → API probing → RLS verification → active attack testing. Outputs severity-bucketed findings with a three-horizon remediation roadmap.", "metadata": {"kind":"procedure"}, "content": "\n## Trigger\nUse when performing an external black-box security audit of a SPA-backed web application.\n\n## Pre-conditions / Inputs\n- Target domain(s) and any known sub-domains\n- `curl`, browser DevTools, `jq` available\n- No authenticated access required (black-box)\n\n## Steps\n\n1. **Baseline infrastructure scan** — check HTTP response codes, security headers (`HSTS`, `CSP`, `X-Frame-Options`, `X-Content-Type-Options`), and CDN/WAF fingerprints.\n2. **Endpoint fuzzing** — probe common admin, debug, and API paths (`/admin`, `/debug`, `/api/v*`, etc.); record which return non-404 responses.\n3. **JS bundle extraction** — download the main bundle (Vite/webpack); grep for secrets (`eyJ`, `key`, `token`, `password`), internal URLs, and API route strings. See [[digest/wiki/supabase-spa-bundle-exposure.md]] for the React/Vite-specific risk.\n4. **API endpoint probing** — hit every discovered route with `GET`/`POST`; map gateway errors vs. real 401/403 vs. data responses.\n5. **Database RLS verification** — if a Supabase anon key is found, query known table names via REST; confirm empty-array vs. data leak.\n6. **Active attack vector testing** — test path traversal (`%2e%2e/`), CORS bypass (`Origin: https://evil.com`), header injection, and rate-limit absence (burst 5+ rapid requests).\n\n## Output\n- Findings bucketed by severity: Critical / High / Medium / Low (CVSS where applicable)\n- Three-horizon remediation roadmap: immediate ≤24 h, urgent ≤1 week, short-term ≤1 month\n- Report delivered as both PDF and Markdown\n\n## Failure Modes / Caveats\n- WAF (e.g. Cloudflare) may block traversal tests; note blocks as positive controls, not gaps.\n- Missing CORS response headers may be an intentional whitelist — distinguish misconfiguration from policy.\n- Anon key exposure severity is gated on RLS posture; always test both dimensions before scoring.\n- Black-box scope may miss authenticated-path vulnerabilities; flag for follow-on authenticated audit.\n\nderived_from:: [[memory/2026-07-26/sumopod-security-audit-findings.md]]\nrelates_to:: [[digest/wiki/supabase-spa-bundle-exposure.md]]\n"}

state: finished

text: Wrote /app/working/workspaces/default/digest/procedure/web-security-audit-methodology.md (2458 bytes)

text:
```yaml
action: CREATE
target_path: digest/procedure/web-security-audit-methodology.md
note: New procedure node capturing the 6-step external black-box SPA audit workflow (infra baseline → fuzzing → bundle extraction → API probing → RLS verification → active attacks), with three-horizon remediation output shape, caveats for WAF interference and CORS ambiguity, and wikilinks to the related supabase-spa-bundle-exposure concept node.
```

role: assistant